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Abstract
Interactive proofs (IP) model a world where a verifier delegates computation to an un-
trustworthy prover, verifying the prover’s claims before accepting them. IP protocols have
applications in areas such as verifiable computation outsourcing, computation delegation,
cloud computing, etc. In these applications, the verifier may pay the prover based on the
quality of his work. Rational interactive proofs (RIP), introduced by Azar and Micali (2012),
are an interactive-proof system with payments, in which the prover is rational rather than
untrustworthy—he may lie, but only to increase his payment. Rational proofs leverage the
prover’s rationality to obtain simple and efficient protocols. Azar and Micali show that
RIP=IP(=PSPACE), i.e., the set of provable languages stay the same with a single rational
prover (compared to classic IP). They leave the question of whether multiple provers are
more powerful than a single prover for rational and classical proofs as an open problem.
In this paper we introduce multi-prover rational interactive proofs (MRIP). Here, a
verifier cross-checks the provers’ answers with each other and pays them according to the
messages exchanged. The provers are cooperative and maximize their total expected payment
if and only if the verifier learns the correct answer to the problem. We further refine the
model of MRIP to incorporate utility gaps, which is the loss in payment suffered by provers
who mislead the verifier to the wrong answer.
We define the class of MRIP protocols with constant, noticeable and negligible util-
ity gaps—the payment loss due to a wrong answer is O(1), 1/nO(1) and 1/2n
O(1)
respec-
tively, where n is the length of the input. We give tight characterization for all three
MRIP classes. On the way, we resolve Azar and Micali’s open problem—under standard
complexity-theoretic assumptions, MRIP is not only more powerful than RIP, but also more
powerful than MIP (classic multi-prover IP); and this is true even the utility gap is required
to be constant. We further show that the full power of each MRIP class can be achieved
using only two provers and three rounds of communication.
1 Introduction
Multi-prover interactive proofs (MIP) [11] and rational interactive proofs (RIP) [5] are two
important extensions of classic (single-prover) interactive proof systems [7, 33]. In a multi-prover
interactive proof, several computationally unbounded, potentially dishonest provers interact
with a polynomial-time, randomized verifier. The provers can pre-agree on a joint strategy to
convince the verifier about the truth of a proposition. However, once the protocol starts, the
provers cannot communicate with each other. If the proposition is true, the verifier should
be convinced with probability 1; otherwise the verifier should reject with probability at least
2/3. It is well known that MIP = NEXP [8], which demonstrates the power of multiple provers
compared to single-prover interactive proofs —recall that IP = PSPACE [42, 47].
Rational interactive proofs [5] are interactive proofs in which the verifier makes a payment
to the prover at the end of the protocol. The prover is assumed to be rational: that is, he
∗A preliminary version of this paper [19] appeared at the 7th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
(ITCS 2016). This is the full version that contains new results.
†Computer Science Department, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA. Email: {jingchen,
shiksingh}@cs.stonybrook.edu
‡IT University of Copenhagen, Rued Langgaards Vej 7, 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark. Email: samc@itu.dk
1
ar
X
iv
:1
50
4.
08
36
1v
5 
 [c
s.C
C]
  1
1 N
ov
 20
17
only acts in ways that maximize his expected payment. Thus, unlike classic interactive proofs,
in rational proofs the prover does not care whether the verifier is convinced or not. Instead,
rational proofs ensure that the prover maximizes the expected payment if and only if the verifier
learns the truth of the proposition. In [5] Azar and Micali introduce rational proofs and show
that while rational proofs are no more powerful than classic interactive proofs in terms of the
class of provable languages (i.e., RIP = PSPACE), the protocols are simpler and more efficient.
They have left the power (and the model) of multi-prover rational proofs as an open problem.
Meanwhile, many real-world computation-outsourcing applications have ingredients of both
MIP and RIP: the verifier pays a team of provers based on their responses. For example,
in Internet marketplaces such as Mechanical Turk [1] and Proof Market [3], the requesters
(verifiers) post labor-intensive tasks on the website along with a monetary compensation they
are willing to pay. The providers (provers) accept these offers and perform the job. In these
marketplaces and other crowdsourcing scenarios [49], correctness is often ensured by verifying
one provider’s answers against another [2, 48]. Thus, the providers implicitly work as a team—
their answers need to match, even though they are likely to not know each other and cannot
communicate with each other [40]. While these applications differ from interactive proofs in
many ways, they motivate the study of a proof system with multiple cooperative rational provers.
Inspired by these applications and previous theoretical work, we introduce multi-prover
rational interactive proofs, which combine elements of rational proofs and classical multi-prover
interactive proofs. In this paper we focus on the following question: what computation problems
can be solved by a team of rational workers who get paid based on the joint-correctness of
their answers and cannot communicate with each other? The main contribution of this paper
is to fully characterize the power of such computation-outsourcing systems, under different
requirements on the payment loss suffered when the provers solve the problem incorrectly. Our
model is formally defined in Section 2; we briefly summarize it below.
Cooperative Multi-Prover Rational Proofs. In a cooperative multi-prover rational in-
teractive proof, polynomially many computationally-unbounded provers communicate with a
polynomial-time randomized verifier, where the verifier wants to decide the membership of an
input string in a language. The provers can pre-agree on how they plan to respond to the
verifier’s messages, but they cannot communicate with each other once the protocol begins. At
the end of the protocol, the verifier outputs the answer and computes a total payment for the
provers, based on the input, his own randomness, and the messages exchanged.
A protocol is an MRIP protocol if any strategy of the provers that maximizes their expected
payment leads the verifier to the correct answer. The class of languages having such protocols
is denoted by MRIP. Note that classical multi-prover interactive proofs are robust against
arbitrary malicious provers; MRIP protocols instead require provers to be rational—a reasonable
requirement in a “mercantile world” [5].
Distribution of Payments. In classical MIP protocols, the provers work cooperatively to
convince the verifier of the truth of a proposition, and their goal is to maximize the verifier’s
acceptance probability. Similarly, the rational provers in MRIP protocols work cooperatively
to maximize the total payment received from the verifier. Any pre-specified way of distributing
this payment among them is allowed, as long as it does not depend on the transcript of the
protocol (i.e., the messages exchanged, the coins flipped, and the amount of the payment). For
instance, the division of the payment can be pre-determined by the provers themselves based
on the amount of work each prover must perform, or it can be pre-determined by the verifier
based on the reputation of each prover in a marketplace. Unbalanced divisions are allowed: for
example, one prover may receive half of the total payment, while the others split the remaining
evenly. We will ignore the choice of division in our model and protocols, as it does not affect
the provers’ decisions when choosing their strategy.
Utility Gaps. Rational proofs assume that the provers always act to maximize their payment.
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However, how much do they lose by lying? If the payment loss is small, a prover may very well
“get lazy” and simply return a default answer without performing any computation. Although
the classic notion of rationality in game theory requires a player to always choose the best
strategy to maximize his utility, the notion of bounded rationality has also been studied [20, 46].
The notion of utility gap measures the payment or utility loss incurred by a deviating prover.
A deviating prover may (a) deviate slightly from the truthful protocol but still lead the verifier
to the correct answer or (b) deviate and mislead the verifier to an incorrect answer. Azar and
Micali [6] introduce utility gaps by demanding their protocols be robust against provers of type
(a)—any deviation from the prescribed strategy results in a significant decrease in the payment.
This ideal requirement on utility gaps is too strong: even the protocol in [6] fails to satisfy it [36].
In this work, we consider multi-prover rational proofs robust against provers of type (b), i.e.,
the provers may send some incorrect messages and only incur a small payment loss, but if they
mislead the verifier to the wrong answer to the membership question of the input string, then
the provers must suffer a significant loss in the payment. Such deviations were also considered
in [36], but for single-prover protocols and with a slightly different notion of utility gaps.
We strengthen our model by considering MRIP protocols with constant as well as noticeable
(i.e. polynomial) utility gaps, where the payment loss suffered by the provers on reporting the
incorrect answer is at least 1/k and 1/nk respectively, where k is a constant and n is the length
of the input string. We say an MRIP protocol has a negligible (or exponential) utility gap if the
payment loss is at least 1/2n
k
. Any MRIP protocol has at least a negligible utility gap, because
the rewards are generated by a polynomial-time verifier.
Complexity Classes With Oracle Queries. Our characterizations of MRIP protocols are
closely related to complexity classes with oracle queries. In particular, let EXP||NP be the class
of languages decidable by an exponential-time Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an
NP oracle. Note that in this case, the queries may be exponentially long. Non-adaptive access
means that all queries must be decided before any one query is made; they may not depend on
each other. Similar classes, such as P||NEXP, are defined analogously. In some cases we consider
complexity classes where the number of oracle queries is limited. For example, P||NEXP[O(1)] is
the class of languages decidable by a polynomial-time Turing machine which can make O(1)
non-adaptive queries to an NEXP oracle.
Many of these classes have been studied previously; see Section 1.2.
1.1 Main Results
We now present our main results and discuss several interesting aspects of our model.
The Power of Multi-Prover Rational Proofs. We denote the classes of MRIP protocols
with constant, polynomial and exponential utility gaps as O(1)-MRIP, poly(n)-MRIP and MRIP
respectively. By definition, O(1)-MRIP ⊆ poly(n)-MRIP ⊆ MRIP.
In this work, we fully characterize the computation power of all three MRIP classes.
Theorem 1. O(1)-MRIP = P||NEXP[O(1)].
That is, a language has an MRIP protocol with constant utility gap if and only if it can be
decided by a polynomial-time Turing machine that makes a constant number of non-adaptive
queries to an NEXP oracle.
Theorem 1 implies that O(1)-MRIP contains both NEXP and coNEXP. That is, multi-prover
rational proofs with even constant utility gaps are strictly more powerful than single-prover
rational proofs, assuming PSPACE 6= NEXP. Furthermore, multi-prover rational proofs (even
with constant utility gaps) are strictly more powerful than classical multi-prover interactive
proofs, assuming NEXP 6= coNEXP. The relationship between rational and classical interactive
proof systems is illustrated in Figure 1.
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NEXP=MIP
EXP
PSPACE = IP = RIP
P||NEXP[O(1)] = O(1)-MRIP
coNEXP
Figure 1: The computation power of rational and classical interactive proof systems. Note that
it is widely believed that PSPACE 6= EXP, EXP 6= NEXP, and NEXP 6= coNEXP.
Theorem 2. poly(n)-MRIP = P||NEXP.
That is, a language has an MRIP protocol with polynomial utility gap if and only if it can
be decided by a polynomial-time Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an NEXP oracle.
Theorem 3. MRIP = EXP||NP.
That is, a language has an MRIP protocol (with exponential utility gap) if and only if it can
be decided by an exponential-time Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an NP oracle.
We give MRIP protocols for NEXP, which are used as a building block in our proofs. To
prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we establish a general reduction between the utility gap of
MRIP protocols and the query complexity of oracle Turing machines. This reduction may be
of independent interest when studying the relationship between these two computation models.
Finally, to prove Theorem 3, we introduce another complexity class as an intermediate step,
and use its circuit characterization to construct the corresponding MRIP protocol. Similar
circuit based characterization is also used by Azar and Micali in [6], but but their technique
results in an exponential blow-up in the number of messages when applied directly to our case.
We use multiple provers to avoid this communication blow up; see Section 5.
MRIP with Two Provers and Constant Number of Rounds. While we allow polyno-
mially many provers and rounds in MRIP, how many provers and rounds are really needed to
capture the full power of the system? In real-world applications, protocols with few provers and
rounds are desirable, as it may be hard for the verifier to recruit a large number of provers or
to retain the provers for a long period of time to execute many rounds.
Under the classic model of interactive proofs, it is well known that any MIP protocol can
be simulated using only two provers and one round of communication between the provers and
the verifier [25]. In this work, we prove analogous results for all three of our MRIP classes.
Specifically, let MRIP[p(n), k(n), t(n)] denote the class of languages that have MRIP proto-
cols with p(n) provers, k(n) rounds, and 1/t(n) utility gap, and let poly(n) and exp(n) denote
the class of polynomial and exponential functions respectively, where n is the input length.
Theorem 4. O(1)-MRIP = MRIP[2, 3, O(1)].
Theorem 5. poly(n)-MRIP = MRIP[2, 3, poly(n)].
Theorem 6. MRIP = MRIP[2, 3, exp(n)].
That is, any MRIP protocol using polynomially many provers and polynomially many rounds
that has a constant, polynomial, or exponential utility gap can be simulated by a 2-prover 3-
round MRIP protocol that retains the utility gap. Our analysis for O(1)-MRIP and poly(n)-MRIP
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relies on a different approach than that for MRIP, and all three theorems are based on our
characterizations for the corresponding general MRIP classes.
It is worth pointing out that we count the number of rounds in a protocol differently from
classic IP and MIP protocols. In the classic protocols, the number of rounds is the number of
pairs of back-and-forth interactions (see, e.g., [25]); while in our protocols it is the total number
of interactions—that is, the provers’ messages and the verifier’s messages are considered as
different rounds. An odd number of rounds is an intrinsic property of multi-prover rational
proofs, as an MRIP protocol by default starts with the provers reporting the answer bit to the
verifier (see Section 2 for details). Thus, the 3-round protocols consist of the first “answer bit
round”, followed by a single back-and-forth exchange corresponding to a single round in IP
or MIP. Indeed, any non-trivial MRIP protocol—that is, any MRIP protocol that cannot be
simulated by a single prover—requires at least three rounds. Thus, three rounds are optimal
and all the theorems above are tight.
Finally, we note that the power of MRIP protocols remains the same even when it is restricted
to constant number of rounds, while the power of RIP protocols decreases. In particular, Azar
and Micali [5] show that the class of languages having constant-round single-prover rational
proofs is exactly the counting hierarchy, while RIP = PSPACE. This difference between MRIP
and RIP is analogous to the difference between MIP and IP.
1.2 Related Work
Interactive Proofs. First introduced by Goldwasser et al. [33] and in a different form by
Babai and Moran [7], interactive proofs (IP) have been extensively studied in the literature [8,
9, 11, 29, 30, 32, 35] and fully characterized by the well known result, IP = PSPACE [42, 47].
Ben-Or et al. [11] introduced multi-prover interactive proofs (MIP), which has been shown to
be exactly NEXP [8]. In fact, two provers and one round are sufficient to achieve the full power
of multi-prover interactive proofs: that is, NEXP = MIP(2, 1) [25].
Introduced by Goldwasser et al. [34], computation delegations are interactive proofs where
the provers are also computationally bounded. These protocols have been studied by many
ever since; see, for example, [15, 16, 38, 39, 44, 45]. Recently, interactive proofs have also been
studied in streaming settings [17, 21, 22, 23].
Rational Proofs. Azar and Micali [5] first introduced rational interactive proofs (RIP) and
used scoring rules to construct simple and efficient (single-prover) RIP protocols. In [6], the
same authors designed super-efficient rational proofs, where the verifier runs in logarithmic
time and the communication complexity is sublinear. Guo et al. [36] considered rational argu-
ments for a computationally bounded prover and a sublinear verifier. In [37], the same authors
constructed rational arguments for all languages in P. Moreover, Campanelli and Rosario [14]
study sequentially composable rational proofs and Zhang and Blanton [52] design protocols to
outsource matrix multiplications to a rational cloud.
Refereed Games. Game-theoretic characterization of complexity classes has been studied in
the form of refereed games [18, 24, 26, 27, 28, 41, 43]. They are interactive proofs consisting
of two competing provers. One of them is always honest and tries to convince the verifier
of the membership (or non-membership) of an input string in a language; the other is always
dishonest and tries to mislead the verifier. Chandra and Stockmeyer [18] show that any language
in PSPACE is refereeable by a game of perfect information, and Feige and Kilian [24] show that
this is tight for single-round refereed games and that the class of languages with polynomial-
round refereed games is exactly EXP.
Feigenbaum et al. [28] show that any language in EXPNP can be simulated as a zero-sum
refereed game between two computationally unbounded provers with imperfect recall. Note
that imperfect recall is a strong assumption and makes the computationally unbounded provers
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essentially act as oracles. By contrast, MRIP protocols have cooperative provers with imperfect
information —since a prover does not see the messages exchanged between the verifier and the
other provers— and perfect recall —since a prover remembers the history of messages exchanged
between himself and the verifier. Note that imperfect information is necessary for multi-prover
protocols: if all provers can see all messages exchanged in the protocol, then the model degen-
erates to a single-prover case. Moreover, perfect recall gives the provers the ability to cheat
adaptively across rounds. To the best of our knowledge, MRIP gives the first game-theoretic
characterization of the class EXP||NP.
Query Complexity and Related Complexity Classes. The query complexity of oracle
Turing machines has been widely studied in the literature [10, 13, 50]. As shown by our work, the
computation power of multi-prover rational proofs is closely related to the query complexity of
oracle Turing machines. Finally, it is worth pointing out that EXPNP is an important complexity
class in the study of circuit lower bounds [51]. It would be interesting to see if the related class
EXP||NP emerges in similar contexts.
2 Multi-Prover Rational Interactive Proofs
In this section, we first define multi-prover rational interactive proofs (MRIP) in general, and
then strengthen the model by imposing proper utility gaps.
2.1 Basic Notation and Definitions
Let L be a language, x a string whose membership in L is to be decided, and n = |x|. An
interactive protocol is a pair (V, ~P ), where V is the verifier and ~P = (P1, . . . , Pp(n)) is the vector
of provers, and p(n) a polynomial in n. The verifier runs in polynomial time and flips private
coins, whereas each prover Pi is computationally unbounded. The verifier and provers know x.
The verifier can communicate with each prover privately, but no two provers can communicate
with each other. In a round, either each prover sends a message to the verifier, or the verifier
sends a message to each prover, and these two cases alternate. Without loss of generality, we
assume the first round of messages are sent by the provers, and the first bit sent by P1, denoted
by c, indicates whether x ∈ L (corresponding to c = 1) or not (corresponding to c = 0).
The length of each message and the number of rounds are polynomial in n. Let k(n) be
the number of rounds and r be the random string used by V . For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k(n)},
let mij be the message exchanged between V and Pi in round j. In particular, the first bit
of m11 is c. The transcript that each prover Pi has seen at the beginning of each round j is
(mi1,mi2, . . . ,mi(j−1)). Let ~m be the vector of all messages exchanged in the protocol. By
definition, ~m is a random variable depending on r.
At the end of the communication, the verifier evaluates the total payment to the provers,
given by a payment function R on x, r, and ~m. We restrict R(x, r, ~m) ∈ [−1, 1] for convenience.
Of course, the payment can be shifted so that it is non-negative—that is, the provers do not
lose money. We use both positive and negative payments to better reflect the intuition behind
our protocols: the former are rewards while the latter are punishments. The protocol followed
by V , including the payment function R, is public knowledge.
The verifier outputs c as the answer for the membership of x in L—that is, V does not check
the provers’ answer. This requirement for the verifier does not change the set of languages that
have multi-prover rational interactive proofs; however, it simplifies our later discussion of utility
gaps (i.e., the payment loss incurred by provers that report the wrong answer).
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2.2 Cooperative Multi-Prover Rational Proofs
Each prover Pi can choose a strategy sij : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ for each round j, which maps the
transcript he has seen up until the beginning of round j to the message he sends in round j.
Note that Pi does not send any message when j is even; in this case sij can be treated as a
constant function. Let si = (si1, . . . , sik(n)) be the strategy vector of Pi and s = (s1, . . . , sp(n))
be the strategy profile of the provers. Given any input x, randomness r and strategy profile s, we
may write the vector ~m of messages exchanged in the protocol more explicitly as (V, ~P )(x, r, s).
The provers are cooperative and jointly act to maximize the total expected payment received
from the verifier. Note that this is equivalent to each prover maximizing his own expected
payment when each Pi receives a pre-specified fraction γi of the payment, where
∑p(n)
i=1 γi = 1
and γi may depend on x but not on r and ~m.
Thus, before the protocol starts, the provers pre-agree on a strategy profile s that maximizes
u(V, ~P )(s;x) , Er
[
R
(
x, r, (V, ~P )(x, r, s)
)]
.
When (V, ~P ) and x are clear from the context, we write u(s) for u(V, ~P )(s;x). We define multi-
prover rational interactive proofs as follows.
Definition 1 (MRIP). For any language L, an interactive protocol (V, ~P ) is a multi-prover
rational interactive proof (MRIP) protocol for L if, for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and any strategy profile
s of the provers such that u(s) = maxs′ u(s
′), c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L. We denote the class
of languages that have MRIP protocols by MRIP.
This definition immediately leads to the following property.
Lemma 1. MRIP is closed under complement.
Proof. Consider a language L ∈ MRIP. Let (V, ~P ) be the MRIP protocol for L, and R the
payment function used by V . We construct an MRIP protocol (V ′, ~P ) for L as follows.
• After receiving message m′11 from P1, V ′ flips the first bit. Denote the new message by m11.
• V ′ runs V to compute the messages he should send in each round, except that m′11 is replaced
by m11 in the input to V . Let ~m
′ be the vector of messages exchanged between V ′ and ~P .
• At the end of the communication, V ′ computes a payment function R′: for any x, r, and ~m′,
R′(x, r, ~m′) = R(x, r, ~m), where ~m is ~m′ with m′11 replaced by m11.
• V ′ outputs the first bit sent by P1.
To see why this is an MRIP protocol for L, for each strategy profile s of the provers in the
protocol (V, ~P ), consider the following strategy profile s′ in the protocol (V ′, ~P ).
• s′i = si for each i 6= 1.
• In round 1, s′1 outputs the same message as s1, except that the first bit is flipped.
• For any odd j > 1 and any transcript m′1 for P1 at the beginning of round j, s′1(m′1) is the
same as s1(m1), where m1 is m
′
1 with the first bit flipped.
By induction, for any x and r, (V ′, ~P )(x, r, s′) is the same as (V, ~P )(x, r, s) except the
first bit. Thus R′(x, r, (V ′, ~P )(x, r, s′)) = R(x, r, (V, ~P )(x, r, s)), which implies u(V ′, ~P )(s
′;x) =
u(V, ~P )(s;x). Since the mapping from s to s
′ is a bijection, if we arbitrarily fix a strategy profile
s′ that maximizes u(V ′, ~P )(s
′;x), the corresponding strategy profile s maximizes u(V, ~P )(s;x). By
definition, x ∈ L if and only if the first bit sent by s1 is 1; thus, x ∈ L if and only if the first bit
sent by s′1 is 1. Therefore (V ′, ~P ) is an MRIP protocol for L.
Note that the MRIP protocols for L and L have the same number of provers and the same
number of rounds. Moreover, recall that (assuming NEXP 6= coNEXP) the class of languages
having classical multi-prover interactive proofs is not closed under complement. Thus multi-
prover rational proofs are already different from classical ones.
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2.3 MRIP Protocols with Constant and Polynomial Utility Gaps
In the MRIP model defined so far, the provers are sensitive to arbitrarily small losses in the
payment. That is, the provers choose s to just maximize their expected payment—the amount
they lose if they use a suboptimal strategy is irrelevant.
In [6], Azar and Micali strengthen the RIP model by requiring that the prover deviating
from the optimal strategy suffers a non-negligible loss in the payment. This loss is demanded
for any deviation, not just for reporting an incorrect answer. Formally, let s be an optimal
strategy and s′ a suboptimal strategy of the prover P . Then the ideal utility gap requires that
u(s) − u(s′) > 1/α(n), where α(n) is constant or polynomial in n. Although an ideal utility
gap strongly guarantees that the prover uses his optimal strategy, as pointed out by [36] such a
utility gap appears to be too strong to hold for many meaningful protocols, even the ones in [6].
In [36], Guo et al. define a weaker notion of utility gap and impose it on rational arguments
rather than rational proofs. They require that a noticeable deviation leads to a noticeable loss:
if under a strategy s′ of the prover, the probability for the verifier to output the correct answer
is noticeably smaller than 1, then the expected payment to the prover under s′ is also noticeably
smaller than the optimal expected payment.
Our notion of utility gaps is slightly different, and we require the provers’ strategies that
report the membership of the input incorrectly suffer a noticeable loss in the payment. Any
MRIP protocol with our notion of utility gaps satisfy the notion of [36], but not vice-versa.
Definition 2 (Utility Gap). Let L be a language in MRIP, (V, ~P ) an MRIP protocol for L,
and α(n) ≥ 0. We say that (V, ~P ) has an α(n)-utility gap if for any input x with |x| = n, any
strategy profile s of ~P that maximizes the expected payment, and any other strategy profile s′,
where the answer bit c′ under s′ does not match the answer bit c under s, i.e., c′ 6= c, then
u(s)− u(s′) > 1
α(n)
.
We denote the class of languages that have an MRIP protocol with constant utility gap
by O(1)-MRIP, and the class of languages that have an MRIP protocol with polynomial (or
noticeable) utility gap by poly(n)-MRIP. Specifically, poly(n)-MRIP is the union of MRIP classes
with α(n) utility gap, where α(n) is a polynomial in n. O(1)-MRIP is defined analogously.
Remark. Since utility gap scales naturally with the payment, it is important to maintain a
fixed budget so as to study them in a consistent way. Otherwise, a polynomial utility gap
under a constant budget can be interpreted as a constant utility gap under a sufficiently-large
polynomial budget. Thus, we maintain a constant budget and the payment is always in [−1, 1].
Following Definition 2, it is not hard to see that the MRIP protocol for L in the proof of
Lemma 1 has the same utility gap as the one for L. Thus we immediately have the following.
Corollary 1. O(1)-MRIP and poly(n)-MRIP are both closed under complement.
3 Warm Up: MRIP Protocols for NEXP
To demonstrate the power of multi-prover rational proofs, we start by constructing two dif-
ferent MRIP protocols for NEXP, the class of languages decidable by exponential-time non-
deterministic Turing machines.
3.1 A Constant-Gap MRIP Protocol for NEXP Based on MIP
First, we show that O(1)-MRIP contains NEXP. We construct the desired MRIP protocol using
an MIP protocol as a blackbox. Existing MIP protocols (see, e.g., [8, 25]) for a language
L ∈ NEXP first reduce L to the NEXP-complete problem Oracle-3SAT, and then run an MIP
protocol for Oracle-3SAT. For completeness, we recall the definition of Oracle-3SAT below.
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Definition 3 (Oracle-3SAT [8]). Let B be a 3-CNF of r+ 3s+ 3 variables. A Boolean function
A : {0, 1}s → {0, 1} is a 3-satisfying oracle for B if B(w,A(b1), A(b2), A(b3)) is satisfied for
all binary strings w of length r + 3s, where b1b2b3 are the last 3s bits of w. The Oracle-3SAT
problem is to decide, for a given B, whether there is a 3-satisfying oracle for it.
Below we prove that any language L ∈ NEXP has a 2-prover 3-round MRIP protocol with
constant utility gap.
Lemma 2. NEXP ⊆ MRIP[2, 3, O(1)].
Proof. The desired MRIP protocol (V, ~P ) is defined in Figure 2.
For any input string x, (V, ~P ) works as follows:
1. P1 sends a bit c ∈ {0, 1} to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. If c = 0, then the protocol ends and the payment given to the provers is R = 1/2;
3. Otherwise, V and ~P run an MIP protocol for proving x ∈ L. If the verifier accepts then
R = 1; else, R = 0.
Figure 2: A simple MRIP protocol for NEXP.
The 2-prover 3-round MRIP protocol is obtained by running the MIP protocol in [25].
Without loss of generality, let the MIP protocol have completeness 1 and soundness 1/3. That
is, the verifier accepts every x ∈ L with probability 1, and every x /∈ L with probability at most
1/3. We show that V outputs 1 if and only if x ∈ L.
For any x ∈ L, if the provers send c = 1 and execute the MIP protocol with V , then the
payment is R = 1 because V accepts with probability 1.1 If they send c = 0, then the payment
is R = 1/2 < 1.
For any x 6∈ L, if the provers send c = 1 and run the MIP protocol, then the probability
that V accepts is at most 1/3 and the expected payment is at most 1/3. If they send c = 0,
then the payment is 1/2 > 1/3.
Thus, V outputs 1 iff x ∈ L, and (V, ~P ) is an MRIP protocol for L. Since the provers’
payment loss when sending the wrong answer bit is at least 1/6, (V, ~P ) has O(1) utility gap.
Combining Corollary 1 and Lemma 2, we have the following.
Corollary 2. coNEXP ⊆ MRIP[2, 3, O(1)].
Remarks. Three rounds of interaction is the best possible for any non-trivial MRIP protocol
with at least two provers, because P1 always sends the answer c in the first round. In particular,
if the protocol has only two rounds, then the last round consists of the verifier sending messages
to the provers and can be eliminated. A single-round MRIP protocol degenerates into a single-
prover rational proof protocol, since the provers can pre-agree on the messages.
The constant utility gap in our MRIP protocol comes from the constant soundness gap of
classical MIP protocols —that is, the gap between the accepting probability for x ∈ L and
x /∈ L. Using the same construction, any classical interactive proof protocol can be converted
into an MRIP protocol where the utility gap is a constant fraction of the original soundness
gap. However, as we show in Section 4, this is not the only way to obtain desirable utility gaps.
1If the MIP protocol does not have perfect completeness and accepts x with probability at least 2/3, then the
expected payment is at least 2/3. This does not affect the correctness of our MRIP protocol.
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3.2 An MRIP Protocol for NEXP Based on Scoring Rules
Although our protocol above is conceptually simple, its implementation relies on MIP protocols,
which are technically complex even after the reduction to Oracle-3SAT. We now construct an
MRIP protocol for any language in NEXP without relying on MIP protocols. Instead, we use a
proper scoring rule to compute the payment for the provers, so as to incentivize them to report
the correct answer. However, the way we use the scoring rule is highly non-standard and differs
from all previous uses of scoring rules (including those in rational proofs [5, 6, 36]). Let us first
recall the notion of proper scoring rules and Brier’s scoring rule [12] in particular.
Proper Scoring Rules. Scoring rules are tools to assess the quality of a probabilistic forecast.
It assigns a numerical score (that is, a payment to the forecaster) to the forecast based on the
predicted distribution and the sample that materializes. More precisely, given any probability
space Σ, letting ∆(Σ) be the set of probability distributions over Σ, a scoring rule is a function
from ∆(Σ)× Σ to R, the set of reals. A scoring rule S is proper if, for any distribution D over
Σ and distribution D′ 6= D, we have∑
ω∈Σ
D(ω)S(D,ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Σ
D(ω)S(D′, ω),
where D(ω) is the probability that ω is drawn from D. A scoring rule S is strictly proper
if the above inequality is strict. Strictly proper scoring rules are useful because a forecaster
maximizes his expected score (i.e. payment) by reporting the true distribution D. See [31] for
a comprehensive survey on scoring rules.
Brier’s Scoring Rule. This classic scoring rule, which we abbreviate to BSR, is defined as
follows: for any distribution D and ω ∈ Σ,
BSR(D,ω) = 2D(ω)−
∑
ω∈Σ
D(ω)2 − 1.
It is well known that BSR is strictly proper.
BSR requires the computation of
∑
ω∈ΣD(ω)
2, which can be hard when |Σ| is large. How-
ever, as in [5] and [36], in this work we only consider Σ = {0, 1}.
BSR has range [−2, 0], but it can be easily shifted and scaled so that (1) the range is non-
negative and bounded, and (2) the resulting scoring rule is still strictly proper. In particular,
we add 2 to the classical BSR score when using it, so as to satisfy these requirements.
Next, we construct a simple and efficient MRIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT. As in classical MIP
protocols, an MRIP protocol for any language L ∈ NEXP can be obtained by first reducing L to
Oracle-3SAT and then using our protocol. As our protocol is highly efficiently, the complexity of
the overall protocol for L is the same as the reduction. Our protocol for Oracle-3SAT is defined
in Figure 3, and we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Oracle-3SAT has a 2-prover 3-round MRIP protocol where, for any instance B of
length n, the randomness used by the verifier, the computation complexity, and the communica-
tion complexity of the protocol are all O(n). Moreover, the evaluation of the payment function
consists of constant number of arithmetic operations over O(n)-bit numbers.
Proof. For any instance B with r+ 3s+ 3 variables (thus n ≥ r+ 3s+ 3), the provers can, with
their unbounded computation power, find an oracle A∗ that maximizes the number of satisfying
(r + 3s)-bit strings for B. Denote this number by a∗. If B ∈ Oracle-3SAT then a∗ = 2r+3s,
otherwise a∗ < 2r+3s.
Roughly speaking, in our MRIP protocol in Figure 3, the verifier incentivizes the provers to
report the correct value of a∗, so that the membership of B can be decided. To see why this is
the case, let s∗ be one of the best strategy profiles of the provers. Then s∗ must satisfy
either c = 1 and a = 2r+3s, or c = 0 and a < 2r+3s. (1)
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For any instance B, the protocol (V, ~P ) works as follows:
1. P1 sends c ∈ {0, 1} and a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2r+3s} to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. If c = 1 and a < 2r+3s, or if c = 0 and a = 2r+3s, the protocol ends, and R = −1.
3. Otherwise, V uniformly and randomly chooses two binary strings of length r + 3s, w =
(z, b1, b2, b3) and w
′ = (z′, b4, b5, b6), as well as a number k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}.
V sends b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6 to P1 and bk to P2.
4. P1 sends to V six bits, A(bi) with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}, and P2 sends one bit, A′(bk).
5. The protocol ends and V computes the payment R as follows.
(a) If A(bk) 6= A′(bk) then R = −1.
(b) Otherwise, if B(z, b1, b2, b3, A(b1), A(b2), A(b3)) = 0 then R = 0.
(c) Else, let b = B(z′, b4, b5, b6, A(b4), A(b5), A(b6)), p1 = a/2r+3s, and p0 = 1− p1.
V computes R using BSR. If b = 1, R =
2p1−(p21+p20)+1
11 , else R =
2p0−(p21+p20)+1
11 .
Figure 3: A simple and efficient MRIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT.
Otherwise, the provers’ expected payment is −1. Meanwhile, by sending c = 0 and a = 0 in
Step 1 and all 0’s in Step 4, their expected payment is 0.
Now we consider which of the two cases in Equation 1 the provers should report. Note that
P2 only answers one query of the verifier (in Step 4). Thus under any strategy s˜2 and given
any c and a, P2 de facto commits to an oracle A
′ : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}. Assume that P1, using
a strategy s˜1 and seeing (b1, ..., b6), sends V six bits in Step 4 that are not consistent with A
′
—that is, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} such that A(bi) 6= A′(bi). Let q be the probability that,
conditioned on (b1, ..., b6), the verifier chooses a k that catches the provers in Step 5a; we have
q ≥ 1/6. Let R be the payment to the provers conditioned on (b1, ..., b6) and on the event that
they are not caught in Step 5a. Note that R ≤ 211 by the definition of Brier’s scoring rule. Thus
the expected payment to the provers conditioned on (b1, ..., b6) is −q + (1− q)R < 0. However,
if P1 answers the verifier’s queries consistently with A
′, their expected payment conditioned on
(b1, ..., b6) is non-negative. Accordingly, the best strategy profile s
∗ must be such that, for any
c, a and the oracle committed by P2, P1’s answers for any (b1, ..., b6) are always consistent with
A′. Thus, under s∗ the payment is never computed in Step 5a.
Whether or not B evaluates to 0 in Step 5b is determined solely by b1, b2, b3 and A
′. If B
evaluates to 0, then it does not matter what a or c is, and the provers’ received payment is 0. If B
does not evaluate to 0 in Step 5b, then the expected payment to the provers in Step 5c is defined
by Brier’s scoring rule: the true distribution of b, denoted by D, is such that D(1) = a′/2r+3s,
with a′ being the number of satisfying (r + 3s)-bit strings for B under oracle A′; the realized
value is b = B(z′, b4, b5, b6, A(b4), A(b5), A(b6)); and the reported distribution is (p1, p0). Indeed,
since b4, b5, b6 are independent from b1, b2, b3, we have that w
′ is a uniformly random input to
B, and the probability for b to be 1 is exactly a′/2r+3s. Since Brier’s scoring rule is strictly
proper, conditioned on A′, the provers maximize the expected payment by reporting
a = a′, (2)
which implies (p1, p0) = (D(1), D(0)).
If B 6∈ Oracle-3SAT, then no matter which oracle A′ is committed under s∗, we have a′ <
2r+3s. By Equations 1 and 2, a < 2r+3s and c = 0 as desired.
If B ∈ Oracle-3SAT, which is the more interesting part, we show that under s∗ prover P2
commits to the desired 3-satisfying oracle A∗ (so that a′ = 2r+3s and D(1) = 1). Let BSR(D)
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denote the expected score for reporting D under BSR, when D is the true distribution.
BSR(D) = D(1)[2D(1)−D(1)2 − (1−D(1))2 − 1] (3)
+(1−D(1))[2(1−D(1))−D(1)2 − (1−D(1))2 − 1]
= 2(D(1)2 −D(1)).
Thus BSR(D) is symmetric at D(1) = 1/2, strictly decreasing on D(1) ∈ [0, 1/2], strictly
increasing on D(1) ∈ [1/2, 1], and maximized when D(1) = 1 or D(1) = 0. Note that the
shifting and scaling of BSR in Step 5c do not change these properties, but make BSR(D)
strictly positive when D(1) = 1 or D(1) = 0. Therefore, to maximize their expected payment
conditioned on the event that Step 5c is reached, P2 should commit to either an oracle A
′ such
that D(1) is as small as possible, or an A′ such that D(1) is as large as possible, whichever
makes D(1) further from 1/2.
If there is no oracle A′ such that a′ = 0, then the only way for the provers to maximize their
expected payment is to commit to the 3-satisfying oracle A∗ (thus a′ = 1), under which Step
5c is reached with probability 1. Again by Equations 1 and 2, we have c = 1 and a = 2r+3s.
If there are both a 3-satisfying oracle A∗ and an oracle A′ such that a′ = 0, we need to make
sure that P2 does not commit to A
′. To do so, we use w along with Step 5b. In particular,
committing to any oracle other than A∗ or A′ results in an expected payment strictly smaller
than that by committing to A∗, since it increases the probability that the protocol ends at
Step 5b with R = 0, and strictly decreases the expected payment conditioned on Step 5c being
reached. Moreover, if P2 commits to A
′, then B always evaluates to 0 in Step 5b, and Step 5c
is actually never reached. Thus, even though by committing to A′ the provers maximize their
expected payment in Step 5c, their actual expected payment is 0. Instead, by committing to
A∗, Step 5c is reached with probability 1 and the provers get positive payment. Accordingly,
the strategy profile s∗ must be such that P2 commits to A∗ and P1 sends a = 2r+3s and c = 1,
as desired. If there are multiple 3-satisfying oracles for B, then the provers can pre-agree on
any one of them (by taking the first in lexicographical order, for example).
In sum, (V, ~P ) is an MRIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT. Since n ≥ r + 3s + 3, the number of
coins flipped by V for sampling w, w′, and k is O(n), and so is the number of bits exchanged
between V and ~P . Moreover, given an input string w = (z, b1, b2, b3) for B and the 3-bit answers
of the oracle for b1, b2, b3, B can be evaluated in linear time. Thus the running time of V is
O(n) plus a constant number of arithmetic operations to compute the payment in Step 5c.
Remarks. There is a tradeoff between the utility gap and the computational efficiency in the
two MRIP protocols we have constructed for NEXP. The protocol in Figure 2 has constant utility
gap but relies on the MIP protocol, which has high (even though polynomial) communication
and computation overheads beyond the reduction to Oracle-3SAT. On the other hand, the
protocol in Figure 3 is very efficient, with just linear computation and communication overheads
beyond the reduction to Oracle-3SAT, but has exponential utility gap. It would be interesting
to see if there exists an MRIP protocol for NEXP that has constant or noticeable utility gap
and is highly efficient (e.g., with linear overhead beyond the reduction to Oracle-3SAT).
To the best of our knowledge, the property of BSR in Equation 3 has never been discussed
in the literature. All existing uses of proper scoring rules are with respect to a fixed distribution
and have the expert report the truth about that distribution. In contrast, our use of scoring rules
compares the expected scores across different distributions: by committing to different oracles,
the expert can choose which distribution is the true distribution, and can tell the truth about
that distribution to maximize his corresponding score. The correctness of our protocol depends
on the expert committing to the distribution with the highest score under truth-telling.
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4 MRIP with Constant and Noticeable Utility Gap
We have shown in Section 3 that the class of MRIP protocols with constant utility gaps contains
both NEXP and coNEXP, making them more powerful than classic MIP protocols. In this
section, we characterize the exact power of the classes of MRIP protocols with constant and
polynomial utility gaps. That is, we prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2:
O(1)-MRIP = P||NEXP[O(1)] and poly(n)-MRIP = P||NEXP.
To do so, let α(n) be a function of n, which (1) only takes positive integral values, (2) is
upper-bounded by a polynomial in n, and (3) is polynomial-time computable.2 We refer to the
class of languages that have an MRIP protocol with O(α(n)) utility gaps as α(n)-MRIP,
Recall that P||NEXP[α(n)] is the class of languages decidable by polynomial-time Turing ma-
chines making O(α(n)) non-adaptive queries to an NEXP oracle. We prove tight upper- and
lower-bounds on the power of the class α(n)-MRIP.
Lemma 4. P||NEXP[α(n)] ⊆ α(n)-MRIP.
Proof. Consider any language L ∈ P||NEXP[α(n)]. Let M be a polynomial-time Turing machine
deciding L, with access to an oracle O for an NEXP language. Without loss of generality, M
makes exactly α(n) ≥ 1 non-adaptive queries to O. The MRIP protocol for L uses our MRIP
protocol for NEXP to simulate the oracle, as in Figure 4.
For any input string x of length n, the protocol (V, ~P ) works as follows. Initially Rn = 0.
1. P1 sends a bit c ∈ {0, 1} to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. V simulates M on x till M outputs α(n) queries for O, denoted by q1, . . . , qα(n).
3. To answer M ’s oracle queries, for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , α(n)}, V does the following:
(a) V first reduces qi to an Oracle-3SAT instance φi (whose length is polynomial in n).
(b) V sends φi to P1 and P2 and executes the MRIP protocol for NEXP in Figure 2.
Let c∗i and R
∗
i be the answer bit and the payment in that protocol respectively. V
returns c∗i as the oracle’s answer for qi, and updates the sum Rn ← Rn +R∗i .
4. V continues simulating M till the end. If c does not match M ’s output, then the protocol
ends with reward R = −1; otherwise the protocol ends with R = Rn/α(n).
Figure 4: An MRIP protocol for P||NEXP[α(n)].
To see why this protocol works, first note that reporting the correct answer bit c and
answering all α(n) NEXP queries q1, . . . , qα(n) correctly leads to a reward R ≥ 1/2 for the
provers. In particular, according to our protocol in Figure 2 and the proof of Lemma 2, if the
provers use the optimal strategy for each query qi (which includes sending the correct answer
bit c∗i ), the provers get R
∗
i = 1 if φi ∈ Oracle-3SAT and R∗i = 1/2 if φi /∈ Oracle-3SAT.
Now, suppose the provers report an incorrect answer bit c′ 6= c at the beginning. Then,
either (a) the output of M in Step 4 does not match c′, and thus R = −1; or (b) there exists
an NEXP query qi such that the answer bit c
∗
i in Step 3b is incorrect.
In case (a), the provers’ expected payment loss is at least 1/2 + 1 = 3/2 > 1/α(n), as
α(n) ≥ 1. In case (b), because the protocol in Figure 2 has O(1) utility gap, the provers’
expected payment loss in the overall protocol is at least 1/O(α(n)). Thus, the provers’ optimal
strategy is to report the correct answer bit c and to answer all α(n) NEXP queries correctly.
To complete the characterization, we prove a tight upper-bound for α(n)-MRIP.
2To prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we only need α(n) to be constant or polynomial in n. However, the
lemmas in this section hold for all α(n)’s that are polynomial-time computable (given 1n) and polynomially
bounded. For example, α(n) can be logn,
√
n, etc.
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Lemma 5. α(n)-MRIP ⊆ P||NEXP[α(n)].
Proof. Given any L ∈ α(n)-MRIP, let (V, ~P ) be the MRIP protocol with O(α(n)) utility gap
for L. Again without loss of generality, assume the utility gap is exactly α(n). To prove Lemma
5, we simulate (V, ~P ) using a P||NEXP[α(n)] Turing machine.
Consider the following deterministic oracle Turing machine M . Given any input x of length
n, M divides [−1, 1] into 4α(n) intervals, each of length 1/(2α(n)). That is, the ith interval is
[i/2α(n), (i+ 1)/2α(n)) for each i ∈ {−2α(n), . . . , 2α(n)− 1}.3 For each interval [i/2α(n), (i+
1)/2α(n)), referred to as interval i, M makes the following queries to an NEXP oracle:
1. Does there exist a strategy profile s˜ in (V, ~P ) with expected payment u(s˜;x) in interval i?
2. Does there exist a strategy profile s˜ in (V, ~P ) with expected payment u(s˜;x) in interval i and
corresponding answer bit c = 1?
Note that M makes O(α(n)) non-adaptive queries, each of polynomial size: indeed, M only
needs to specify x, the value i and the query index. Some of these queries may turn out to be
unnecessary in the end, but they are made anyway so as to preserve non-adaptivity.
We now show that the queries made by M can be answered by an NEXP oracle. Recall that
in an MRIP protocol, a strategy s˜jk of each prover Pj for each round k is a function mapping the
transcript Pj has seen at the beginning of round k to the message he sends in that round. Since
the protocol has polynomially many provers and polynomially many rounds, a strategy profile s˜
consists of polynomially many functions from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}∗, and for each function, both the
input length and the output length are polynomial in n. Thus it takes at most exponentially
many bits to specify a strategy profile: if the input length is at most p(n) and the output length
is at most q(n), then 2p(n)q(n) bits are sufficient to specify the truth table of a function.
Thus, an NEXP machine can non-deterministically choose a strategy profile s˜. It then goes
through all possible realizations of V ’s random string and, for each realization, simulates (V, ~P )
on input x using s˜, to compute the reward R. Finally, the NEXP machine computes the expected
payment u(s˜;x), checks if u(s˜;x) is in interval i (and if c = 1 for query 2), and accepts or rejects
accordingly. It is easy to see that if the desired strategy profile s˜ exists then this machine
accepts s˜; otherwise it always rejects.
Since the verifier’s random string has polynomially many bits, there are exponentially many
realizations in total. Since V runs in polynomial time and it takes exponential time to look up
the truth tables for s˜, each realization takes exponential time to run. Thus this machine runs
in non-deterministic exponential time, and M ’s queries can be answered by an NEXP oracle.
Finally, given the oracle’s answers to its queries, M finds the highest index i∗ such that
interval i∗ is “non-empty”: that is, the oracle has answered 1 for query 1 for this interval. M
accepts if the oracle’s answer to query 2 for this interval is 1, and rejects otherwise. It is clear
that M runs in polynomial time.
The only thing left to show is that M decides L given correct answers to its oracle queries.
By definition, for the best strategy profile s∗ of the provers in (V, ~P ) for x, u(s∗;x) falls into
interval i∗. Because (V, ~P ) has α(n) utility gap and each interval is of length 1/(2α(n)), by
Definition 2, all strategy profiles whose expected payments are in interval i∗ must have the
same answer bit c as that in s∗. By the definition of MRIP protocols, x ∈ L if and only if c = 1,
which occurs if and only if the oracle’s answer to query 2 for interval i∗ is 1. Thus M decides
L and Lemma 5 holds.
Proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 together imply that, for any pos-
itive integral function α(n) that is polynomially bounded and polynomial-time computable,
α(n)-MRIP = P||NEXP[α(n)].
3To include 1 as a possible reward, interval 2α(n) − 1 should be closed on both sides; we ignore this for
simplicity.
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Theorem 1 holds by taking α(n) = O(1); and Theorem 2 holds because poly(n)-MRIP =⋃
α(n)=nk:k≥0 α(n)-MRIP =
⋃
α(n)=nk:k≥0 P
||NEXP[α(n)] = P||NEXP.
5 Full Power of Multi-Prover Rational Interactive Proofs
In this section we prove Theorem 3, that is, MRIP = EXP||NP. We first show that MRIP is the
same as another complexity class, EXP||poly−NEXP, which we define below. We complete the
proof of Theorem 3 by showing EXP||NP = EXP||poly−NEXP.
Definition 4. EXP||poly−NEXP is the class of languages decidable by an exponential-time Turing
machine with non-adaptive access to an NEXP oracle, such that the length of each oracle query
is polynomial in the length of the input of the Turing machine.
5.1 Preliminaries for Our Lower Bound
In the lemma below, we first provide a lower bound on the class MRIP. In Section 5.3 we give
a matching upper bound, leading to a tight characterization.
Lemma 6. EXP||poly−NEXP ⊆ MRIP.
To prove Lemma 6, let us recall some definitions and results from the literature of circuit
complexity. First of all, a circuit family {Cn}∞n=1 is a sequence of Boolean circuits such that
Cn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The gates are of types AND, OR, and NOT, with fan-ins 2, 2, and 1
respectively. The input to a circuit is connected to a special set of “input gates”, one for each
bit of the input, whose output value is always the value of the corresponding bit. The size of a
circuit C is the number of gates in C, including the input gates. We index the gates in a circuit
of size g using {1, 2, ..., g}. Without loss of generality we assume that gate g is the output gate
of the whole circuit. Moreover, if C has input length n, without loss of generality we assume
that gates 1, 2, .., n are the input gates. Note that the number of wires in C is at most 2g, since
each gate has fan-in at most 2. Thus we index the circuit’s wires using {1, 2, ..., 2g}.
Definition 5 (DC uniform circuits [4]). A circuit family {Cn}∞n=1 is a Direct Connect uniform
(DC uniform) family if the following questions can be answered in time polynomial in n:
1. SIZE(n): what is the size of Cn?
2. INPUT(n, h, i): is wire h an input to gate i in Cn?
3. OUTPUT(n, h, i): is wire h the output of gate i in Cn?
4. TYPE(n, i, t): is t the type of gate i in Cn?
That is, the circuits in a DC uniform family may have exponential size, but they have a
succinct representation such that a polynomial-time Turing machine can answer all the questions
in Definition 5. The class EXP can be characterized by the class of DC uniform circuit families:
Lemma 7 ([4]). For any language L, L ∈ EXP if and only if it can be computed by a DC
uniform circuit family of size 2n
O(1)
.
Next, we prove the following lemma, which is used in the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 8. Every language L in EXP has an MRIP protocol with two provers and five rounds
based on DC uniform circuit families.
Proof. By Lemma 7, there exists a DC uniform circuit family {Cn}∞n=1 that computes L. Let
g = 2n
k
be the size of each Cn, where k is a constant that may depend on L. We call a gate
i′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., g} of Cn an input gate of gate i if there is a directed wire from i′ to i. For any
input string x of length n and any gate i in Cn, let vi(x) ∈ {0, 1} be the value of i’s output on
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For any input string x of length n,
1. P1 sends one bit c ∈ {0, 1} to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. V computes g =SIZE(n), picks a gate i ∈ {1, 2, ..., g} uniformly at random, and sends i
to P1. That is, V queries P1 for:
(a) the type of gate i,
(b) the input gates and input wires of i, and
(c) the values of gate i and its input gates.
3. P1 sends to V : type ti ∈ {AND, OR, NOT, INPUT}; gates i1, i2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., g}; wires
h1, h2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2g}; and values vi(x), vi1(x), vi2(x) ∈ {0, 1}.
4. V picks a gate i′ ∈ {i, i1, i2} uniformly at random and sends i′ to P2.
5. P2 sends v
′
i′(x) ∈ {0, 1} to V .
6. The protocol ends and V computes the payment R by verifying the following statements:
(a) ti is the correct type of i and the set of input gates of i is correct using DC uniformity;
(b) if i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} (that is, an input gate of the circuit), then vi(x) = xi;
(c) if i = g (that is, the output gate of the circuit), then vi(x) = c;
(d) if ti ∈ {AND, OR, NOT}, vi(x) follows the correct logic based on ti and i’s inputs.
(e) The answers of P1 and P2 on the value of gate i
′ are consistent.
If any of these verifications fails then R = 0; otherwise R = 1.
Figure 5: An MRIP protocol for EXP.
input x. In particular, vi(x) = xi for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. The 2-prover 5-round MRIP protocol
(V, ~P ) for L is given in Figure 5.
To see why it is an MRIP protocol, notice that if P1 and P2 send the correct c and always
answer V ’s queries correctly according to Cn, then the payment to them is always R = 1,
irrespective of V ’s coin flips. Thus the expected payment is 1. Below we show that any other
strategy profile makes the expected payment strictly less than 1.
First of all, when the gate i chosen by the verifier in Step 2 is not an input gate, if any
of P1’s answers in Step 3 to queries 2a and 2b (namely, about i’s type, input gates and input
wires) is incorrect, then by DC uniformity the verification in Step 6a will fail, giving the provers
a payment R = 0. Indeed, to verify whether i1 and i2 are the input gates of i, it suffices to
verify whether h1 and h2 are both the input wires of i and the output wires of i1 and i2: this is
why V queries P1 about i’s input wires. Accordingly, if such a gate i exists then the expected
payment to the provers will be at most 1− 1/g < 1.
Similarly, if there exists a non-input gate i such that P1 answers queries 2a and 2b correctly
but the values vi(x), vi1(x), vi2(x) are inconsistent with i’s type, then Step 6d will fail conditioned
on gate i being chosen, and the expected payment to the provers is at most 1 − 1/g < 1.
Moreover, if there exists an input gate i such that vi(x) 6= xi, or if vg(x) 6= c, then conditioned
on gate i being chosen, the expected payment is again at most 1− 1/g < 1.
Next, as in the proof of Lemma 3, P2 is only queried once (in Step 5). Thus P2 de facto
commits to an oracle A : {1, . . . , g} → {0, 1}, which maps each gate to its value under input x.
If there exists a gate i such that the values vi(x), vi1(x), vi2(x) in Step 3 are not consistent with
A, then, conditioned on i being chosen in Step 2, Step 6e will fail with probability 1/3. Since i
is chosen with probability 1/g, the expected payment will be at most 1− 13g < 1.
Thus, the only strategy profile s˜ that can have expected payment equal to 1 is the following:
1. P1 and P2 report values of gates using the same oracle A : {1, . . . , g} → {0, 1},
2. A(i) = xi for any input gate i,
3. A(g) = c for the output gate, and
4. for any other gate i, A(i) is computed correctly based on i’s type and input gates in Cn.
Thus, A(g) is computed according to Cn with input x, and A(g) = 1 if and only if x ∈ L. Since
c = A(g), we have that c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L and (V, ~P ) is an MRIP protocol for L.
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5.2 Lower Bound for MRIP
Using the protocol in Figure 5 as a building block, we are now ready to prove Lemma 6.
Circuits for EXP||poly−NEXP. We start by creating some circuit structures for the class
EXP||poly−NEXP. For any language L ∈ EXP||poly−NEXP, let M be an exponential-time oracle
Turing machine that decides L using an oracle O. Without loss of generality, assume O is for
Oracle-3SAT. Let q(n) be the number of oracle queries made by M on any input x of length n,
and p(n) be the length of each query. By the definition of EXP||poly−NEXP, q(n) can be exponen-
tial in n, while p(n) is polynomial. Without loss of generality, p(n) ≥ 5. Let `(n) = p(n)q(n).
When n is clear from context, we refer to `(n), p(n) and q(n) as `, p and q respectively.
Since the oracle queries are non-adaptive, there exists an exponential-time-computable func-
tion f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n, f(x) ∈ {0, 1}` and f(x) is the vector of
oracle queries made by M given x. (f is exponential-time computable because we can run M
on x until it outputs all the queries.) As in Lemma 7, there exists a DC uniform circuit family
{Cn}∞n=0 of size 2n
O(1)
that computes f , where for any n, Cn has n-bit input and `-bit output.
Without loss of generality, the gates of Cn can be partitioned into q sets, one for each oracle
query, such that the output of a gate only affects the value of the corresponding query. This can
be done by duplicating each gate at most an exponential number of times. The resulting circuit
family is still DC uniform. Also without loss of generality, the oracle queries are all different.
This can be done by including the index i ∈ {1, . . . , q} in the ith query.
Given the vector of oracle answers corresponding to the q queries of M , b ∈ {0, 1}q, the
membership of x can be decided in time exponential in n. Let f ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} be a
function such that, given any (n+ q)-bit input (x, b) where |x| = n and b is the vector of oracle
answers M gets with input x, f ′(x, b) is the output of M . Again, f ′ is computable by a DC-
uniform circuit family {C ′n}∞n=1 of size 2n
O(1)
, where each C ′n has (n + q)-bit input and 1-bit
output. The size of C ′n is exponential in n but may not be exponential in its own input length,
since q may be exponential in n. In particular, the Turing machine that answers questions
SIZE, INPUT, OUTPUT, TYPE for C ′n runs in time polynomial in n rather than n+ q.
Given the two circuit families defined above, the membership of x in L can be computed by
the following three-level “circuit:” besides the usual AND, OR, NOT gates, it has q “NEXP”
gates, each of which has a p-bit input and 1-bit output, simulating the Oracle-3SAT oracle.
• Level 1: The circuit Cn for computing f . We denote its output by (φ1, φ2, ..., φq), where each
φi is of p bits and is an instance of Oracle-3SAT. Let g = 2
nk be the size of Cn, where k is a
constant. Similar to our naming convention before, the set of gates is {1, 2, ..., g}, the set of
input gates is {1, 2, ..., n}, and the set of output gates is {n + 1, n + 2, ..., n + `}. The input
and the output gates correspond to x and (φ1, φ2, ..., φq) in the natural order.
• Level 2: We have q NEXP gates, without loss of generality denoted by g+1, g+2, ..., g+q. For
each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., q}, gate g + i takes input φi and outputs 1 if and only if φi ∈ Oracle-3SAT.
• Level 3: The circuit C ′n for computing f ′. Let g′ = 2n
k′
be the size of C ′n, where k′ is a
constant. The set of gates is {g + q + 1, g + q + 2, ..., g + q + g′}, the set of input gates is
{g+ q+ 1, ..., g+ q+n, g+ q+n+ 1, ..., g+ q+n+ q}, and the output gate is gate g+ q+ g′.
The first n input gates connect to x, and the remaining ones connect to the NEXP gates of
Level 2. The output of C ′n is the final output of the whole circuit.
Inside the three-level circuit, we can compute each output gate of Level 1 and Level 3
using the protocol in Figure 5, and each NEXP gate in Level 2 using the protocol in Figure 2.
However, we need to show that there exists an MRIP protocol (V, ~P ) where the verifier can get
a consistent answer to all of them simultaneously. In particular, the provers should not lie in
Cn in order to change the input to the NEXP queries to gain a higher overall expected payment.
Our protocol. Our protocol is specified in Figure 6. It uses four provers. In this protocol the
verifier needs to compute q(n) and p(n). Without loss of generality, we assume q(n) = 2n
d
for
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some constant d, so its binary representation can be computed in time polynomial in n. Since
p(n) is a polynomial in n, it can be computed by a polynomial-time verifier.
For any input string x of length n,
1. P1 sends one bit c ∈ {0, 1} to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. V computes g = SIZE(Cn), q(n), and g
′ = SIZE(C ′n).
V picks a gate i ∈ {1, 2, ..., g + q + g′} uniformly at random and sends i to P1.
By doing so, V queries P1 for:
(a) the type ti of gate i,
(b) the input gates and input wires of i, and
(c) the values of gate i and its input gates.
3. P1 sends to V the following:
(a) type ti ∈ {AND, OR, NOT, INPUT,NEXP};
(b) input gates i1, i2, . . . , if(i) and input wires h1, h2, . . . , hf(i), where f(i) is the number
of input gates of type ti; and
(c) values of gate i and its input gates: vi(x), vi1(x), vi2(x), . . . , vif(i)(x).
4. V verifies the following using DC uniformity or the naming convention:
(a) ti is the correct type of i (in particular, if i ∈ {g+ 1, ..., g+ q} then ti = NEXP) and
f(i) is correct for ti; and
(b) the set of input gates of i is correct.
If any of the verifications fails, the protocol ends and R = −1.
5. V picks a gate i′ uniformly at random from {i} ∪ {i1 . . . , if(i)}, and sends i′ to P2.
6. P2 sends v
′
i′(x) ∈ {0, 1} to V .
7. Consistency. V verifies vi′(x) = v
′
i′(x): that is, the answers of P1 and P2 on the value
of gate i′ are consistent. If not, the protocol ends and R = −1.
8. Correctness (Non-NEXP gates). If ti 6= NEXP, then V checks if vi(x) is computed
correctly from vi1(x), vi2(x), . . . , vif(i)(x) as follows:
(a) if ti = INPUT then vi(x) = vi1(x), and if i is one of the first n gates in Cn or C
′
n,
then vi(x) equals the corresponding bit of x;
(b) if ti ∈ {AND, OR, NOT}, then vi(x) follows the logic between i and its inputs.
(c) if i = g + q + g′ (i.e., the output gate of the whole circuit), then vi(x) = c.
The protocol ends with the following reward: if any of the verifications fails then R =
− 1p+1 , otherwise R = 1p+1 , where p is the length of each NEXP query.
9. Correctness (NEXP gates). If ti = NEXP, then V first checks if φi = (vi1(x), ..., vip(x))
forms a valid Oracle-3SAT instance.a If not, the protocol ends with R = − 2p+1 .
If φi is a valid Oracle-3SAT instance, then V sends φi to P3 and P4 and runs the MRIP
protocol for NEXP in Figure 2. Let c∗ and R∗ respectively be the output and the reward
of the NEXP protocol. If c∗ = vi(x) then R = 2R
∗
p+1 ; otherwise R = − 2p+1 .
aWithout loss of generality, we assume that the instances of Oracle-3SAT have a canonical form.
Figure 6: An MRIP protocol for EXP||poly−NEXP.
To prove the correctness of the protocol in Figure 6, first note that for any input string x, no
matter which gate i is chosen by V in Step 2, if the provers always give correct answers according
to the computation of Cn, the NEXP gates and C
′
n, the payment to them is R ≥ 1p+1 > 0. The
first inequality is tight when either (a) i is not an NEXP gate, or (b) i is an NEXP gate and
the corresponding query φi is not in Oracle-3SAT (since R
∗ = 1/2 in this case). If i is an NEXP
gate and φi ∈ Oracle-3SAT, then R = 2p+1 as R∗ = 1. Let s be the strategy profile where the
provers always send correct answers as described above. Thus we have u(s) ≥ 1p+1 .
The correctness of our protocol. Arbitrarily fix a best strategy profile s∗ of the provers,
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we show that under s∗, c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L.
Since P2 is queried only once (Step 6), as in the proof of Lemma 3, any strategy of P2
commits to an oracle A : {1, 2, ..., g + q + g′} → {0, 1}, mapping each gate in the three-level
circuit to its value under input x. First, we show that for non-NEXP gates, P1 answers all
queries consistently with A.
Claim 1. Under s∗, for any gate i that is not an NEXP gate and is chosen by the verifier in
Step 2, P1 reports the correct type and input gates of i in Step 3, and reports the values of gate i
and its input gates consistently with A.
Proof. Suppose there exists a non-NEXP gate i such that P1 does not report its type and input
gates correctly. Conditioned on i being chosen by the verifier, some verification in Step 4 is
guaranteed to fail, and the payment is −1. Consider the following alternative strategy s′1 of
P1: if i is not chosen by V , then P1’s strategy remains the same; if i is chosen, then P1 acts
“correctly” as specified in Claim 1. Under this strategy, when i is chosen the payment is at
least − 1p+1 > −1, and when i is not chosen the payment stays the same. Thus the expected
payment gets larger, contradicting the fact that s∗ is the provers’ best strategy profile.
Similarly, consider the case where P1 reports i’s type and input gates correctly, but the
reported values do not match A on some gate i′ ∈ {i} ∪ {i1, . . . , if(i)}. Conditioned on gate
i being chosen, with probability at least 1f(i)+1 ≥ 13 , V picks i′ in Step 5 and the consistency
check in Step 7 fails, leading to a payment of −1. If i′ is not chosen in Step 5, the payment
to the provers is at most 1p+1 (in Step 8). Thus the expected payment conditioned on i being
chosen is at most
−1
3
+
2
3
· 1
p+ 1
< − 1
p+ 1
,
where the inequality holds since p ≥ 5. Again, consider the alternative strategy s′1 of P1.
Under this strategy, conditioned on i being chosen the expected payment is at least − 1p+1 ; and
conditioned on i not being chosen it stays the same. Thus the expected payment gets larger,
again a contradiction.
Below we only need to consider cases where P1 acts according to Claim 1. We argue about
the correctness of A on non-NEXP gates, and we have the following.
Claim 2. Under s∗, for every gate i that is not an NEXP gate, A(i) and the values
A(i1), . . . , A(if(i)) are such that the verifications in Step 8 succeed.
Proof. By contradiction, assume this is not the case and compare s∗ with the “always correct”
strategy profile s previously defined. Recall that, conditioned on i being chosen, for any non-
NEXP gate i the payment under s is exactly 1p+1 , and for any NEXP gate i the payment under
s is at least 1p+1 .
Under s∗, by Claim 1, P1’s answers for vi(x), vi1(x), . . . , vif(i)(x) are consistent with A. If A
makes some verification in Step 8 fail, then conditioned on i being chosen, the payment under
s∗ is − 1p+1 . That is, the payment under s∗ drops by 2p+1 compared with that under s.
However, s and s∗ may not have the same oracle queries to Oracle-3SAT. For each NEXP
gate j where the two queries differ, conditioned on j being chosen, the best case for s∗ (and the
worst case for the analysis) is that its query φ∗j is in Oracle-3SAT, resulting in payment
2
p+1 ,
while the query φj of s is not in Oracle-3SAT, resulting in payment
1
p+1 . That is, the payment
under s∗ increases by 1p+1 compared with that under s.
Fortunately, for each NEXP gate j, in order for the two queries to differ, there exists at
least one non-NEXP gate i in the part of the circuit Cn for computing the input to j, where
the computation of A (and thus s∗) is incorrect, and A(i) and A(i1), . . . , A(if(i)) make some
verification in Step 8 fail. Otherwise the queries made by A are computed correctly from the
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input x and are the same as those under s. Since gate j and the corresponding gate i are chosen
with the same probability 1g+q+g′ , we have
u(s)− u(s∗) ≥ 1
g + q + g′
· 2
p+ 1
− 1
g + q + g′
· 1
p+ 1
> 0.
If there is more than one such j, their corresponding gates i are all different from each other,
because the circuits for computing different oracle queries are disjoint from each other—so the
gap between u(s) and u(s∗) becomes even larger. This contradicts that s∗ is the provers’ best
strategy, and thus Claim 2 holds.
Now we only need to consider cases where P1 acts according to Claims 1 and 2. We prove
the correctness of A on NEXP gates.
Claim 3. Under s∗, for every NEXP gate i, P1 reports the correct type and input gates of i
in Step 3, and reports the values of gate i and its input gates consistently with A. Moreover,
φi = (A(i1), . . . , A(ip)) forms a valid Oracle-3SAT instance and A(i) = 1 iff φi ∈ Oracle-3SAT.
Proof. The fact that φi forms a valid Oracle-3SAT instance follows immediately from Claims 1
and 2, because each bit of φi is the output of a logic gate and thus computed correctly from the
input x according to Cn. We again compare s
∗ with the always-correct strategy profile s.
Note that A and s are both correct on Cn, thus form the same Oracle-3SAT queries. They
both evaluate C ′n correctly as well, but it is possible that A has incorrect outputs of the NEXP
gates and thus incorrect inputs to C ′n. Nevertheless, for each non-NEXP gate i′, conditioned
on i′ being chosen, s∗ makes the verifications in Step 8 succeed, and the payment is 1p+1 under
both s and s∗.
If P1 reports i’s type and input gates incorrectly under s
∗, then the payment is −1 (Step 4)
conditioned on i being chosen. However, by reporting the required information correctly and
reporting vi(x), vi1(x), . . . , vip(x) consistently with A, the corresponding payment is at least
− 2p+1 > −1 and the expected payment increases, contradicting with the fact that s∗ is the
provers’ best strategy profile.
Suppose P1 reports i’s type and input gates correctly, but reports vi′(x) inconsistently with
A for some i′ ∈ {i} ∪ {i1, . . . , ip}. In this case, with probability at least 1p+1 the payment is −1
(Step 7), and with probability at most 1− 1p+1 the payment is at most 2p+1 (Step 9). Thus the
expected payment is
R ≤ − 1
p+ 1
+ (1− 1
p+ 1
) · 2
p+ 1
=
1
p+ 1
− 2
(p+ 1)2
<
1
p+ 1
.
The corresponding expected payment under s is at least 1p+1 . As the two strategy profiles
have the same payment 1p+1 conditioned on every non-NEXP gate i
′ being chosen, we have
u(s) > u(s∗), a contradiction.
Finally, assume P1 is consistent with A, but A(i) is not the correct answer of φi. If the answer
bit c∗ given by P3 and P4 is different from A(i) (i.e., vi(x)), then the payment is − 2p+1 < 1p+1 ,
less than the payment received under the always-correct strategy profile s. If c∗ = vi(x), then
c∗ is the wrong answer bit in the MRIP protocol for NEXP, and the resulting payment R∗ is
strictly less than the payment under s. Thus, again we have that u(s) > u(s∗), which is a
contradiction, and Claim 3 holds.
Claims 1, 2, and 3 together imply that the always-correct strategy profile s is the only
possibility for the provers’ best strategy profiles; that is, s∗ = s. Under s, for any gate i, A(i)
is the correct value of i under input x, and c = A(g + q + g′). Thus c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L,
and Lemma 6 holds.
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Remark. When proving Theorem 6 in Section 6.2, we show that any MRIP protocol can be
simulated using only 2 provers. In this section we still describe the protocol in Figure 6 using 4
provers, to ease the analysis and to avoid entangling the proofs of Theorem 3 and Theorem 6.
5.3 Upper Bound for MRIP
We now give a tight upper-bound on MRIP, leading to an exact characterization.
Lemma 9. MRIP ⊆ EXP||poly−NEXP.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5. Let L be a language with an MRIP protocol
(V, ~P ). Since V runs in polynomial time, there exists a constant k such that, for any two
payments R and R′ generated by V on the same input of length n and different random coins:
R 6= R′ ⇒ |R−R′| ≥ 1
2nk
.
For example, nk can be an upper bound on V ’s running time. Moreover, since V uses poly-
nomially many random coins, there exists a constant k′ such that any payment that appears
with positive probability under an input of length n must appear with probability at least 1
2nk
′ .
Thus, for an input x of length n, and any two strategy profiles s and s′, where the expected
payments u(s;x) and u(s′;x) are different,
|u(s;x)− u(s′;x)| ≥ 1
2nk+k
′ . (4)
Consider the following deterministic oracle Turing machine M : given any input x of length
n, M divides the interval [−1, 1] into 4 · 2nk+k′ sub-intervals of length 1
2·2nk+k′
. For any i ∈
{−2 · 2nk+k′ + 1, . . . , 2 · 2nk+k′}, the ith interval is
[
(i−1)
2·2nk+k′
, i
2·2nk+k′
]
. For each interval i, M
makes the following two queries to an NEXP oracle:
1. Does there exist a strategy profile s in (V, ~P ) with expected payment u(s;x) in interval i?
2. Does there exist a strategy profile s in (V, ~P ) with expected payment u(s;x) in interval i and
the corresponding answer bit c = 1?
M makes exponentially many non-adaptive queries, and each query has length polynomial in n.
Furthermore, each query can be answered by an NEXP oracle; see the proof of Lemma 5.
Given the oracle’s answers, M finds the highest index i∗ such that interval i∗ is non-empty:
that is, the oracle’s answer to the first query for interval i∗ is 1. M accepts if the answer to the
second query for interval i∗ is 1, and rejects otherwise. M clearly runs in exponential time.
We show that M decides L given correct answers to its queries. Similar to Lemma 5, by
Definition 1, the best strategy profile s∗ has the highest expected payment u(s∗;x), which falls
into interval i∗. By Inequality 4, any strategy profile s′ with u(s′;x) < u(s∗;x) has u(s′;x) not
in interval i∗, since the difference between u(s′;x) and u(s∗;x) is larger than the length of the
interval. Thus, any strategy profile s′ with u(s′;x) in interval i∗ satisfies u(s′;x) = u(s∗;x), i.e,
they are all the best strategy profiles of the provers. In particular, the answer bit c is the same
under all these strategy profiles, and c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L. So the second query for interval
i∗ is 1 if and only if x ∈ L, and M decides L.
5.4 Final Characterization
So far we have established that MRIP = EXP||poly−NEXP. To finish the proof of Theorem 3, we
show EXP||poly−NEXP equals EXP||NP.
Lemma 10. EXP||poly−NEXP = EXP||NP.
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Proof. First, we show EXP||poly−NEXP ⊆ EXP||NP using a padding argument. Let M1 be an
exponential-time oracle Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an oracle O1 for an NEXP
language, where the lengths of the oracle queries are polynomial in the input length. Let O1
be decided by a non-deterministic Turing machine M ′1 with time complexity 2|q|
k1 , where k1 is
a constant and q is the query to the oracle (the input to M ′1). We simulate M
O1
1 using another
exponential-time oracle Turning machine M2 and another oracle O2, as follows.
Given any input x of length n, M2 runs M1 to generate all the oracle queries. For each
query q, M2 generates a query q
′ which is q followed by 2|q|k1 bits of 1. It then gives all the
new queries to its own oracle O2. Given the oracle’s answers, M2 continues running M1 to the
end, and accepts if and only if M1 does. Since |q| is polynomial in n, 2|q|k1 is exponential in
n. Furthermore, since there are exponentially many queries and M1 runs in exponential time,
we have that M2 runs in exponential time as well. It is clear that (1) M2 makes non-adaptive
oracle queries, and (2) MO22 decides the same language as M
O1
1 , as long as O2’s answer to each
query q′ is the same as O1’s answer to the corresponding query q.
We define O2 by constructing a non-deterministic Turing machine M
′
2 that simulates M
′
1.
That is, O2 will be the language decided by M
′
2. More specifically, given a query q
′ (q followed
by 2|q|k1 1s), M ′2 runs M ′1 on q, makes the same non-deterministic choices as M ′1, and outputs
whatever M ′1 outputs. Since M ′1 runs in time 2|q|
k1 , M2′ runs in time polynomial in its own
input size. Thus, the language O2 decided by M
′
2 is in NP, and q
′ ∈ O2 if and only if q ∈ O1.
Accordingly, MO22 decides the same language as M
O1
1 , and we have EXP
||poly−NEXP ⊆ EXP||NP.
Now, we show EXP||NP ⊆ EXP||poly−NEXP. The proof is similar to the above. Let M2 be an
exponential-time oracle Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an oracle O2 for an NP
language. Note that the queries made by M2 can be exponentially long. Let O2 be decided by
a non-deterministic Turing machine M ′2 that runs in time |q|k2 , where k2 is a constant and q is
the query to O2 (the input to M
′
2). We simulate M
O2
2 using an exponential-time oracle Turning
machine M1 and an oracle O1, as follows.
Given any input x of length n, M1 runs M2 to compute the number of oracle queries made
by M2, denoted by Q. M1 generates Q oracle queries, with the ith query being x followed by
the binary representation of i. Since M2 makes at most exponentially many queries, the length
of each query made by M1 is (at most) polynomial in n.
Query i of M1 is to the following question: is the ith query made by M2 given input x in
the NP language O2? M1 then gives all its queries to its own oracle O1. Given O1’s answers,
M1 uses them to continue running M2, and accepts if and only if M2 does. Since M2 runs
in exponential time, M1 runs in exponential time as well. It is clear that (1) M1 makes non-
adaptive oracle queries, and (2) MO11 decides the same language as M
O2
2 as long as O1 answers
each query correctly.
We define O1 by constructing a non-deterministic Turing machine M
′
1 that simulates M
′
2.
That is, O1 will be the language decided by M
′
1. More specifically, given an input string of the
form (x, y), M ′1 interprets the second part as the binary representation of an integer i. It runs
M2 on x to compute its ith query, denoted by q. It then runs M
′
2 on q, makes the same non-
deterministic choices as M ′2, and outputs whatever M ′2 outputs. Since q is at most exponentially
long in |x| and M ′2 runs in time |q|k2 , the running time of M ′1 is (at most) exponential in its
input length. Thus, the language O1 decided by MO1 is in NEXP. Moreover, if q ∈ O2, then
there exist non-deterministic choices that cause M ′2 and thus M ′1 to accept; otherwise both
reject. That is, O1’s answers to the queries by M1 on input x are the same as O2’s answers to
the queries by M2 on the same input.
Thus, MO11 decides the same language as M
O2
2 , and we have EXP
||NP ⊆ EXP||poly−NEXP.
Proof of Theorem 3. The theorem follows immediately from Lemmas 6, 9, and 10.
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6 MRIP Protocols with Two Provers and Constant Rounds
So far, we allow MRIP protocols to have polynomially many provers and polynomially many
rounds, as in MIP protocols in general. It is well known that any MIP protocol can be simulated
using just two provers and one round [25], which is clearly optimal in terms of both prover
number and round number. In this section, we show similar results for MRIP protocols. Recall
from Section 1.1 that we use MRIP[p(n), k(n), t(n)] to denote the set of languages that have
MRIP protocols with p(n) provers, k(n) rounds, and 1/t(n) utility gap.
6.1 Constant and Noticeable Utility Gap
We first prove Theorem 4 and Theorem 5: that is, any MRIP protocol with a constant or
polynomial utility gap can be simulated by a 2-prover, 3-round MRIP protocol that retains the
corresponding class of utility gaps. We do so directly using our characterizations in Section 4.
Proof of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5. Recall from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 that
α(n)-MRIP = P||NEXP[α(n)],
for any positive integral function α(n) that is polynomially bounded and polynomial-time com-
putable. We show that 2 provers and 3 rounds are enough to simulate the protocol in Figure 4.
Setting α(n) to be a constant or a polynomial in n leads to the corresponding theorems.
More precisely, for any language L ∈ α(n)-MRIP, we have L ∈ P||NEXP[α(n)]. By definition,
there exists a polynomial-time oracle Turing machine M that decides L using O(α(n)) non-
adaptive queries to an NEXP oracle. Again we assume without loss of generality that the oracle
is Oracle-3SAT and M makes exactly α(n) oracle queries. Consider the following 2-prover 3-
round variant of the MRIP protocol in Figure 4 for L. For any input x of length n:
• V computes the queries made by M , denoted by φ1, . . . , φα(n).
• In the first round, P1 sends to V the answer bit c to the membership of x in L, as well as the
answer bits to all queries, c∗1, c∗2, . . . , c∗α(n), where c
∗
i is the answer to φi. As P1 can compute
all oracle queries by running M on x, there is no need for V to send φ1, . . . , φα(n) to him.
• After V has received the answer bits for all φi’s, he distinguishes two cases.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , α(n)} with c∗i = 0, V sets R∗i = 1/2. For all i’s such that c∗i = 1, V runs
the 2-prover 3-round MRIP protocol in Figure 2 for the φi’s simultaneously. That is, for each
such i, V uses fresh randomness to compute his messages to P1 and P2 in the second round of
the MRIP protocol for φi, denoted by m
i
12 and m
i
22 respectively, which are by definition his
first messages in the corresponding MIP protocol. In the second round of the overall protocol,
V sends the concatenation of the mi12’s to P1 and the concatenation of the m
i
22’s to P2.
• In the third round, for each i such that c∗i = 1, P1 computes his response mi13 to mi12, and P2
computes his response mi23 to m
i
22. They send the concatenation of their responses to V .
• For each i such that c∗i = 1, V finishes the MIP protocol following the messages exchanged
for φi. If the MIP protocol accepts then V sets R
∗
i = 1; otherwise R
∗
i = 0.
• Finally, V simulates M till the end using the c∗i ’s. If the answer bit c does not match
M ’s output, then the protocol ends with R = −1; otherwise the protocol ends with R =
(
∑α(n)
i=1 R
∗
i )/α(n). V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
The correctness of this protocol is similar to Lemma 4, except some subtleties caused by
the simultaneous execution of the MRIP protocols for the φi’s. First of all, sending c and
c∗1, . . . , c∗α(n) such that the output of M does not match c cannot be part of the provers’ best
strategy profile, because it leads to R = −1, while sending all messages truthfully leads to
R ≥ 1/2. Second, by linearity of expectation, for any strategy profile of the provers such that c
matches the output of M given c∗1, . . . , c∗α(n), the expected payment is the sum of the expected
payment for each φi.
Note that for each φi, V ’s messages in the corresponding MIP protocol only depends on his
randomness, and he uses fresh coins for φi. Thus, even though the provers also see V ’s messages
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for other φj ’s, they cannot improve V ’s marginal accepting probability for φi. From this, the
expected payment for each φi is still maximized when the provers report the correct c
∗
i and,
when c∗i = 1, run the corresponding MIP protocol correctly. Therefore, under the provers’ best
strategy profile, the c∗i ’s are correct answers to M ’s oracle queries, c is the correct output of M
given the c∗i ’s, and c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L.
Finally, the utility gap of the above protocol is the same as the protocol in Figure 4, which
is O(α(n)). So we have P||NEXP[α(n)] ⊆ MRIP[2, 3, O(α(n))] ⊆ α(n)-MRIP, where the second
inclusion is by definition. Thus we have shown that,
α(n)-MRIP = MRIP[2, 3, O(α(n))].
Theorem 4 holds by setting α(n) to be a constant, and Theorem 5 holds by considering all
functions α(n) = nk, where k ≥ 0 is a constant.
6.2 Negligible Utility Gap
Next, we prove Theorem 6, that is, any MRIP protocol can be simulated by another one using
only 2 provers and 3 rounds. In the conference version of this paper [19], we constructed a
protocol to simulate any MRIP protocol using 2 provers and 5 rounds. In that protocol, the
verifier uses P1’s responses to compute his message to P2, similar to the protocol in Figure 6,
and thus needs 5 rounds. We left as an open problem whether it is possible to improve the round
complexity to 3, which is the best possible following the discussion at the end of Section 3.1.
In this work, we remove the dependency between the verifier’s messages to the two provers,
so they can be sent in parallel, achieving the optimal round complexity. Unlike the protocol in
Section 6.1, this simulation does not preserve the utility gap of the original protocol: even if
the latter has a constant or noticeable utility gap, the resulting one has a negligible gap.
Proof of Theorem 6. Arbitrarily fix an MRIP protocol (V, ~P ) for a language L with p(n) provers
and k(n) rounds. Without loss of generality, each message in the protocol is of length `(n) for
any input of length n, where `(n) is a polynomial in n. We shift and re-scale the reward
function of V , so that the payment is always in [0, 1], and the expected payment is strictly
larger than 0 under the provers’ best strategy profile. The corresponding 2-prover 3-round
protocol (V ′, (P ′1, P ′2)) is defined in Figure 7.
Essentially, V ′ asks P ′1 to simulate all provers in the original protocol. V ′ wants to use P ′2
to cross-check the transcript provided by P ′1, but in parallel: that is, without waiting for P ′1’s
message. He does so by randomly generating a proxy string of polynomial length and giving
it to P ′2. There is an exponentially small probability that this string is consistent with the
transcript P ′1 sends, and if it turns out to be consistent, V ′ goes on to match the answers he
receives from P ′1 and P ′2, and to compute the payment as in the 5-round protocol in [19].
To see why this protocol works, first note that, even though V ′ sends to P ′1 the randomness
r used by V , V ′ himself uses fresh randomness in Step 2 to generate i, j and m∗i , which are
unknown to P ′1. Second, the strategy of P ′2 in Step 3 de facto commits to a strategy profile for
the provers in (V, ~P ) except for the first round, which together with the randomness r of V and
m11, . . . ,mp(n)1 sent by P
′
1 determines a transcript ~m
∗ in (V, ~P ).
We distinguish two cases for the strategy profiles of (P ′1, P ′2).
Case 1. For some randomness r, P ′1 and P ′2 do not agree on the transcript under r: that is,
~m 6= ~m∗, where ~m is the transcript sent by P ′1. Arbitrarily fix such an r. Suppose ~m disagrees
with ~m∗ on some y out of p(n)(k(n)− 1) messages, with y ≥ 1. Then the probability that the
prover index i and the round number j chosen by V ′ in Step 2 satisfy m∗ij 6= mij is yp(n)(k(n)−1) .
When m∗ij 6= mij , if the random string m∗i generated by V ′ in Step 2 does not equal
(mi1, . . . ,mi(j−1)), then the inconsistency between m∗ij and mij is not caught and the pay-
ment is 0; otherwise the payment is −1. When m∗ij = mij , the payment is either 0 or at most
1
p(n)2k(n)`(n)
, again depending on whether m∗i = (mi1, . . . ,mi(j−1)) or not. Finally, as the length
24
For any input string x of length n, the protocol (V ′, ~P ′) works as follows:
1. P ′1 sends m11, . . . ,mp(n)1 to V ′, where mij denotes the message sent by prover Pi in
round j of (V, ~P ) according to the best strategy profile s of ~P .
Let c be the first bit of m11. V
′ outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. V ′ generates the random string r used by V and sends it to P ′1. V ′ selects, uniformly
at random, a prover index i ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)} and a round number j ∈ {2, . . . , k(n)}. V ′
then generates a random string m∗i of length (j − 1)`(n) and sends (i, j,m∗i ) to P ′2.
3. P ′1 uses r, m11, . . . ,mp(n)1 and s to continue simulating the protocol (V, ~P ), and sends
to V ′ the messages from round 2 to round k(n) in the resulting transcript ~m. P ′2 uses
m∗i (and s) to simulate Pi on round j, and sends the resulting message m
′
ij to V
′.
4. If m∗i 6= (mi1, . . . ,mi(j−1)), then the protocol ends with payment R′ = 0.
5. If mij 6= m′ij , then R′ = −1. Else, V ′ computes the payment R in the protocol (V, ~P )
using x, r and ~m, and sets R′ = R
p(n)2k(n)`(n)
.
Figure 7: Simulating any MRIP protocol with 2 provers and 3 rounds.
of each message in (V, ~P ) is `(n), for any i and j, the probability that m∗i = (mi1, . . . ,mi(j−1)) is
1
2(j−1)`(n) ≥ 12(k(n)−1)`(n) . We upper bound the expected payment R′ in Case 1 under r as follows.
R′ ≤
∑
i≤p(n),2≤j≤k(n)
1
p(n)(k(n)− 1) ·
1
2(j−1)`(n)
·
(
Im∗ij 6=mij · (−1) + Im∗ij=mij ·
1
p(n)2k(n)`(n)
)
≤ − y
p(n)(k(n)− 1) ·
1
2(k(n)−1)`(n)
+
∑
i≤p(n),2≤j≤k(n)
1
p(n)(k(n)− 1) ·
1
2(j−1)`(n)
· Im∗ij=mij ·
1
p(n)2k(n)`(n)
< − y
p(n)(k(n)− 1) ·
1
2(k(n)−1)`(n)
+
∑
2≤j≤k(n)
1
k(n)− 1 ·
1
2(j−1)`(n)
· 1
p(n)2k(n)`(n)
< − y
p(n)(k(n)− 1) ·
1
2(k(n)−1)`(n)
+
1
(k(n)− 1)p(n)2k(n)`(n)
=
1− 2y
(k(n)− 1)p(n)2k(n)`(n) < 0.
On the other hand, if P ′1 acts consistently with P ′2 in Step 3 under r, and keeps his strategy
unchanged under any other randomness of V sent to him by V ′, then the expected payment
under r is at least 0 and the expected payment under any other randomness of V does not
change; therefore, the expected payment in the whole protocol gets larger. Accordingly, under
the best strategy profile of (P ′1, P ′2), Case 1 does not occur for any randomness r of V .
Case 2. In their strategy profile s′, P ′1 and P ′2 agree on the transcript ~m under every
randomness r of V , but the strategy profile s˜ committed by them for (V, ~P ) (that is, by P ′1 in
Step 1 for round 1 and then by P ′2 in Step 3 for the remaining rounds) has the answer bit c
incorrect. Thus s˜ is not the best strategy profile s of ~P .
In this case, given any randomness r, prover i and round j chosen by V ′ in Step 2, the
expected payment is
R′ =
1
2(j−1)`(n)
· R
p(n)2k(n)`(n)
,
where R is the payment of (V, ~P ) under s˜ and r. Therefore, the expected payment for P ′1 and
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P ′2 in the whole protocol is
u(V ′, ~P ′)(s
′;x) =
∑
i≤p(n),2≤j≤k(n)
1
p(n)(k(n)− 1) ·
1
2(j−1)`(n)
·
u(V, ~P )(s˜;x)
p(n)2k(n)`(n)
<
∑
i≤p(n),2≤j≤k(n)
1
p(n)(k(n)− 1) ·
1
2(j−1)`(n)
·
u(V, ~P )(s;x)
p(n)2k(n)`(n)
,
where the inequality is because u(V, ~P )(s˜;x) < u(V, ~P )(s;x). Note that the second line in the
equation above is exactly the expected payment for P ′1 and P ′2 when they commit to s. Thus
committing to s˜ is not the best strategy profile for P ′1 and P ′2.
In sum, a best strategy profile for the provers in (V ′, ~P ′) is to commit to a best strategy
profile s in (V, ~P ), and the corresponding answer bit c is 1 if and only if x ∈ L, following fact
that (V, ~P ) is an MRIP protocol for L.
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